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Editorial on the Research Topic
The Comparative Psychology of Intelligence: Macphail Revisited
In a series of papers in the 80s, Macphail (1982, 1985, 1987) put forth evidence in support of
the Null Hypothesis for differences in intelligence across non-human species, stating in his 1985
paper that there are “no differences, either qualitative or quantitative, among vertebrates” (p. 46).
He further claimed that association formation dominates intelligent behavior, that any differences
in intelligence between species could be accounted for by the differential effects of contextual
variables, that learning mechanisms are of general applicability and did not evolve as species-
specific specializations, and that human intelligence differs from that of other animals in that only
humans possess a species-specific language device.
The peer commentaries onMacphail’s (1987) Behavioral and Brain Sciences paper were generally
negative. The most scathing comment was from Goldman-Rakic and Preuss (1987) who suggested
that “Macphail’s ‘null hypothesis’ is merely the epitaph on the head stone of comparative cognition”
(p. 667). Surprisingly, despite the negative tone, Macphail (1987) ended his response to the
commentaries on an uplifting note, stating that “For my part, I remain an optimist, and prefer
to see the failure to demonstrate differences as evidence not that our scientific procedures are
weak but that the animal mind is not what we expected it to be. And after all, did we really
expect that it would be?” (p. 688). Based on the growth of comparative cognition in the more than
three decades since Macphail’s (1987) paper, and the papers included in this Research Topic, it is
clear Macphail was right to be optimistic. As Pepperberg notes, Macphail (1987) should be given
credit for “. . . instigating a variety of controversies, stimulating the wide-ranging discussions, and
generating the types of challenges that have led to many new avenues of research” (p. 10).
At the time, many of the remarkable abilities of non-human animals were unknown toMacphail.
Abilities such as episodic memory, theory of mind, orthographic processing, planning for the
future, fast mapping, and numerical competence, to name but a few, were yet to have their time in
the limelight.With the wealth of comparative data collected over the past 30 years, we thought it was
timely to review the status of Macphail’s Null Hypothesis, and gauge how the current generation of
comparative psychologists approach the inherent challenge that Macphail put forward.
The manuscripts we received ranged from empirical to theoretical, and covered research on
a variety of different animals such as pigeons, fish, rats, humans, parrots, eels, crows, monkeys,
marine mammals, and spiders. All the papers addressed Macphail’s main claim that there are no
qualitative or quantitative differences in intelligence across species. A subset of papers addressed
Macphail’s other claims that (1) contextual variables can explain all of the observed differences
between species, (2) associative processes account for all non-human intelligence, and (3) the
uniqueness of human intelligence is due to a species-specific language acquisition device.
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QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE
DIFFERENCES
Issues of the definition of intelligence aside, virtually all of
the manuscripts supported Macphail’s view that there are no
qualitative differences in intelligence across animals. Whether
it is orthographic processing in pigeons (Scarf and Colombo)
numerical competence in pigeons, crows, and fish (Scarf and
Colombo; Nieder; Petrazzini et al.), counterintuitive features of
skill learning in rats (Reid and Swafford), planning in humans
(Martin-Ordas), syntactic abilities in parrots (Pepperberg),
spatial learning in eels (Watanabe), working memory in crows
(Hahn and Rose), the irrational choices of pigeons and humans
(Stagner et al.; Zentall), equivalence relations (Colombo and
Scarf; Zentall), a variety of other abilities in marine mammals
(Bauer et al.) and birds (Bastos and Taylor; Zentall), tool use
(Cabrera-Álvarez and Clayton), predatory strategies in spiders
(Cross et al.), or complex sequential behavior in rats, mice,
pigeons, and humans (Fountain et al.), not to mention a host of
other sophisticated behaviors alluded to in many of these papers
that have been conducted over the past three and a half decades,
all vertebrates seem capable of displaying behaviors that were
once considered the domain of only humans or, at most, non-
human primates. On the issue of qualitative differences, what
might easily be considered the core thrust of the Null Hypothesis,
Macphail was nothing short of prescient.
While there was consensus regarding the absence of
qualitative differences across species, the majority of the papers
were in favor of rejecting Macphail’s Null Hypothesis with
respect to no quantitative differences across species. The issue
of quantitative differences is difficult and depends, of course,
on how one chooses to define “quantitative.” Macphail (1985)
defined a quantitative difference as “. . . one species used a
mechanism or mechanisms common to both species more
efficiently than the other, and this might be reflected in a
faster rate of solution or better asymptotic performance. . . ” (p.
38). If defined by asymptotic performance, the fact that the
performance of animals on tasks of orthographic processing and
numerical competence (Scarf and Colombo), syntactic abilities
(Pepperberg), and tool use (Cabrera-Álvarez and Clayton) are
comparable between distantly related species (namely birds and
primates) lends supports to Macphail’s view that there may not
even be quantitative differences across species. Cross et al. take
this one step further by suggesting that there are even comparable
predatory strategies between vertebrate species and spiders (i.e.,
a non-vertebrate species). That said, most of the papers in the
Research Topic accepted that quantitative differences do exist
between species, especially if one takes Macphail’s definition of
“quantitative” as measured by faster rates of solution, or more
efficient use of an ability, a vague term that might better be cast
as greater flexibility in the use of an ability.
ROLE OF CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
Most of the papers also agree that contextual variables can explain
many of the observed differences in abilities across species. The
case for the importance of contextual variables was made most
strongly by Colombo and Scarf who showed that with respect
to a number of tasks, when contextual variables are properly
accounted for, qualitative differences that have been observed
across different animals vanish. Schubiger et al. presented an
enormous list of potential contextual variables, both subject-
related and task-related, supporting the possibility that once
considered, evidence of even quantitative differences may vanish
as well.
THE ROLE OF ASSOCIATIONS AND THE
UNIQUENESS OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
Although few, some papers also tackled Macphail’s (1987)
claims that association formation underlies intelligence and the
uniqueness of human language. With respect to association
formation, there were those that supported the idea that
association processes underlie cognitive behavior (Scarf and
Colombo; Colombo and Scarf), and those that disagreed that
cognitive behavior is guided by associative processes (Bastos and
Taylor). There seems little doubt that associative processes are
universal. Whether Macphail was correct when he stated that
association formation dominates intelligent behavior hinges, as
so many commentaries in his 1987 paper raised, on how one
defines “intelligence.” Bauer et al. were correct when they stated
that “In many ways, ‘intelligence’ seems to be a folk psychology
term that maps poorly on natural psychological and biological
processes, and therefore, lends itself to a wide range of often-
inconsistent interpretations” (p 14). Whether behaviors extend
beyond associative process is a complex topic. In his typically
prescient manner, Macphail (1987) forestalled this issue when
he stated that “The problem is that we do not understand what
processes underlie. . . complex behavior” (p. 683).
On the topic of language, countering Macphail’s (1987) claim
of a species-specific language acquisition device that sets humans
apart from other animals, Corballis elegantly highlights the
fact that language is now recognized as an amalgam of several
abilities (e.g., mental time travel, theory of mind, etc.), many
which are present to varying degrees in non-human animals.
Further, according to Corballis, it is unlikely that the hierarchical
and generative aspects of thought are even unique to humans.
Petrazzini et al. echoed similar sentiments in their paper. Thus,
if anything, it would seem that Macphail erred on the side of
caution with his Null Hypothesis, as it appears that even language
may not be a dividing line between humans and non-humans.
THEORETICAL ISSUES
A number of papers also addressed a variety of theoretical
issues around the notion of a Null Hypothesis. Petrazzini et al.
called into question how we assess the presence vs. absence of
differences between species. Traditionally, in keeping with its
namesake, Macphail’s Null Hypothesis is assessed by rejecting or
failing to reject the null hypothesis based on a p-value. Petrazzini
et al. argued for finer comparative methodologies such as a
Bayesian approach, which would evaluate the relative strength
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of two competing hypotheses. Similarly, Bastos and Taylor also
suggested a Bayesian framework to distinguish between support
for the Null Hypothesis and a lack of statistical power. Taking this
one step further, even when paired with null-hypothesis testing,
Bayes factor could be made mandatory for comparative papers,
allowing a measure of confidence in any null findings.
Finally, Hahn and Rose argue that working memory is a
critical component of cognitive abilities, and that a better way
to compare species is to use their working memory capacity
and retention limits as a proxy for their cognitive abilities.
“Differences and similarities in WM (e.g., in its capacity) may
offer insights into why some animals may be (un-)able (sic) to
display certain cognitive behaviors. Macphail’s null-hypothesis
can thus be investigated in the light of potentially qualitative,
and quantitative differences of a fundamental trait of cognition”
(p. 2).
CONCLUSIONS
In light of the results of research over the past 30 years, Macphail’s
hypothesis that all vertebrates have similar cognitive capacities
may not be as implausible as it may have at appeared at the time.
In order to conclude that there are qualitative or quantitative
differences among species, however, one must first eliminate
important differences in contextual variables concerned with
perception, motor skills, and motivation. If nothing else,
Macphail’s proposition has served as encouragement and a
valuable challenge to comparative researchers to conduct well
designed tests of the abilities of a large number of animal species.
Fountain et al. are correct when they say that “. . .Macphail’s
claim continues to challenge all empiricists and theorists
to consider the power of even simple neural systems to
account for animals’ ability to encode simplicity in terms of
neural representation from the complexity of the surrounding
environmental milieu” (p. 3). With respect to the other
issues that Macphail raised, such as whether species differ
quantitatively and whether association formation dominates
intelligent behavior, Macphail (1987) provided a roadmap
as to how the field of comparative cognition can advance
our understanding of the human mind by stating that “I
express the hope that workers seeking to disprove the null
hypothesis will attempt to devise novel tasks for comparative
work—tasks which associative devices could not solve”
(p. 683).
There is much that the field of comparative cognition owes
to Macphail. Corballis stated it perfectly when he said that
“Macphail’s writing set up the challenge, and attempting to
answer it can only advance our knowledge of how animals think,
and where humans fit into the overall scheme of things” (p. 8).
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